RED & GREENFRONTIER RESEARCH OFFICE
← Frontier LedgerEPISODE 1 · ECONOMY & DESIGN
THE FRONTIER LEDGER / EPISODE 1HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES · 2021–2022

BEYOND THE EMISSION LOOP

More rewards.
More assets.
Less value?

Axie, Pegaxy, Crabada and STEPN exposed a recurring pressure: reward tokens and earning assets can multiply faster than the demand that gives them value.

Our response has three pillars.
Controlled growth. Capped emissions. An economy built for use.

Follow the evidence ↓
READ THIS AS A DESIGN ARGUMENT

Historical evidence is sourced. RAG mechanisms are planned design, not proof of future price performance.

01 / CONTROLLED GROWTH

Open the gates deliberately.

Restrict Hasher minting and in-game sales to manage new earning capacity, instead of allowing player-driven breeding to dictate asset growth.

02 / CAPPED EMISSIONS

A schedule, not an open tap.

A planned 21 million TRDR cap, a fixed reward budget and halvings every 26 weeks. Earlier periods distribute more tokens.

03 / TOKEN VELOCITY

Give rewards somewhere to go.

Recurring game spending across three modes, with part of applicable spend permanently locked. Activity must translate into useful demand.

Understand the tokens.
Then follow the assets.

A flagship token and a reward token solve different jobs. Having two tokens does not, by itself, balance an economy.

This is the early-cycle story, not a claim that either project stopped evolving.

Axie introduced later SLP policy changes, including a 44 billion policy cap in January 2024. Pegaxy added entry-funded racing in 2022 and later migrated VIS. RAG did not invent sinks, fusion or prize-funded competition. [4] [7] [8]

A token problem.
And an asset problem.

01

Growth makes expansion attractive

New players want earning assets. Breeders spend reward tokens to create those assets. Strong resale demand can temporarily make the loop look balanced.

02

The sink expands production

Breeding consumes tokens, but adds another asset capable of earning rewards. A short-term token sink can therefore expand longer-term reward capacity.

03

Demand slows before supply does

Existing assets remain. Players keep earning, while buyers become harder to find. Falling asset margins reduce the incentive to breed—and the demand for the reward token.

04

Expectations reprice together

Lower token prices reduce dollar earnings. If buyers value an NFT mainly for future earnings, they offer less for it. Selling can reinforce the decline in both markets.

“Hyperinflation” needs care.

Here we mean rapid game-token supply expansion and oversupplied assets—not a formal diagnosis of economy-wide consumer-price hyperinflation. A falling price alone does not establish its cause. Market sentiment, liquidity, changing rules and security shocks also matter. [1] [3] [6]

AN ILLUSTRATION, NOT A VALUATION MODEL

The same earning token count.
A very different dollar expectation.

A hypothetical asset earning 100 tokens per day produces $10 at $0.10/token, but only $1 at $0.01/token. Its token earnings did not change. The buyer’s economic expectations did.

100 TOKENS / DAY$10 → $1No promised income. No implied NFT price floor.

One reward pool.
More players share it.

Change DAU to see average weekly rewards per player. Set a TRDR price to view the USD value, then see how much remains freely circulating after treasury tax and spending.

Slider: 1–1,000. Type a higher number to override.

Manual scenario price; not a live quote or price forecast.

Modelled liquid market cap

Presets calculate a scenario price from the selected week’s modelled free-flowing supply, after tournament treasury rake.

Include launch / LP float if applicable. Default 0 models rewards only; it is not a verified circulating-supply figure.

FIXED WEEKLY REWARD POOL
AVERAGE WEEKLY REWARDS PER PLAYER

Weekly reward pool ÷ DAU. More players means a smaller average; the total pool stays fixed within the halving period.

NEW FREELY CIRCULATING TRDR / WEEK

Freely circulatingTreasury heldPermanently locked
Treasury held / week
Permanently locked / week

Treasury receipts are held. Mining Claim distributions remain freely transferable, so they are included in the liquid amount. Permanent locking reduces liquid availability, not minted supply.

Show the weekly token breakdown

Spending splits: 40% permanently locked, 50% working treasury, 10% Mining Claims. Claim tax goes entirely to treasury. This reward-only breakdown excludes tournament entries; the tournament calculator below adds their treasury rake separately. Treasury selling remains excluded.

Free-flowing TRDR after rake
Liquid market cap · scenarioFree-flowing TRDR × selected price
FDV · 21M TRDR capMaximum supply × selected price
Free flowingTreasury heldPermanently locked

Priced in USD. Paid in TRDR.

For simplicity, this calculator assumes tournaments are available from day 1. Entry prices are set in USD; players pay the equivalent amount in TRDR at the selected token price.

Enter the combined spend across Trader and Volatility. USD buy-in value ÷ your TRDR price gives token turnover. Rake is split 62.5% to treasury and 37.5% to Mining Claims: at 8% rake, that is 5% / 3%, leaving 92% for prizes. This scenario assumes full-fee entrants; Mining Claim fee waivers are not modelled.

Selected week’s net change in freely circulating TRDR

Prize tokens and Mining Claim receipts remain liquid. Reusing the same tokens in multiple tournaments is turnover, not new supply. Only the treasury-held rake reduces the modelled free-flowing balance. No permanent tournament burn is assumed.

How the outstanding supply is calculated

Each halving period lasts 26 weeks. The model sums each completed week through the selected week, using that period’s reward pool and your current tax and sink settings. It adds any initial liquid balance and subtracts tournament treasury rake from week 1 onward. Tournament DAU, daily USD spend, rake and TRDR price are held constant across all modelled tournament weeks.

This is a reconstructed scenario, not on-chain circulating supply. It excludes later spending of old player balances, additional rewards outside this pool, fee waivers, transfers from treasury, and other lockups. Market-cap presets solve: price = (target liquid market cap + cumulative treasury rake in USD) ÷ liquid supply before tournament rake. Token price does not change the week-16 launch date.

The per-player figure is an arithmetic average across DAU, not an equal-payout promise. The planned leaderboard pays TRDR to 65% of players and gear boxes to the bottom 35%. USD values use your selected price; no price movement is simulated. The liquid share is a percentage of weekly rewards, not a token-wide inflation rate.

Look at the market history.

Live provider charts sit beside the supply research. A price chart shows what the market paid—not why prices changed and not how many tokens circulated.

TradingView embeds load third-party content and may be blocked by privacy tools or network restrictions. Provider coverage, exchange history and delayed data can vary. RAG has no verified market chart in this report; the planned supply graph is not a price forecast.

Different by design.
Proven through play.

We are changing the structure of issuance and demand. These are mechanisms to test, not reasons to promise a good chart.

CONTROLLED DAU IS THE OBJECTIVE

Control the intake. Measure the actual players.

RAG plans to pace growth through restricted minting and in-game sales, matching access to the earning economy with observed demand. Player-driven breeding will not set the issuance rate.

Asset supply alone does not set exact DAU: rentals, resales, starter access, inactive holders and multiple accounts matter too. The release policy must define which assets grant access, how many teams can play and when new capacity opens. Publish that policy alongside live participation.

WHY EARLY PARTICIPATION MATTERS

The first periods have
larger token budgets.

Like Bitcoin in one specific respect, TRDR’s planned distribution uses a supply cap and scheduled halvings. It is not Bitcoin mining or Bitcoin’s security model. For the same rank allocation, the first period distributes twice the TRDR of the second and four times the third.

Early players can progress while the reward pool is larger. That is an advantage measured in token units—not guaranteed profit. Competition, costs, token price and execution risk still determine the result.

PERIOD 1 · WEEKS 1–26302,884.62 TRDR / week
PERIOD 2 · WEEKS 27–52151,442.31 TRDR / week
PERIOD 3 · WEEKS 53–7875,721.15 TRDR / week

Shown from the current model’s 15.75M reward allocation. Not a dollar valuation or individual payout forecast.

VELOCITY WITH A DESTINATION

Earn → play → spend → compete again.

RAG’s focus is on repeated use of tokens: gear boxes, repairs, fusion, account unlocks and tournament entries. The goal is demand from things players want to do, rather than demand only for the next asset they hope to sell.

40%Permanent lock50%Working treasury10%Mining Claims

Split applies to eligible TRDR spending, not claim tax or tournament entries. Transaction volume is not the same as net buying. Faster token turnover can coexist with low prices; only actual participation, net liquid supply changes and market demand reveal whether the design works.

THE PRESSUREOUR PLANNED RESPONSEWHAT STILL HAS TO WORK

More earning assets can mean more emissions.

A budget before a payout.

A fixed weekly TRDR pool, halving every 26 weeks. More players and Hashers compete over the same period budget.

Budget enforcement, anti-bot controls and clear rules for every additional reward source. A cap does not prevent circulating-supply growth during distribution.

Demand depends on creating the next earning asset.

Reasons to spend beyond expansion.

Gear boxes, repairs, fusion, progression and tournaments across Hasher, Volatility and Trader.

Players must want the experience at the price. A long list of sinks is not evidence of willingness to pay.

Every reward becomes another market listing.

Progression that stays with the player.

Milestone Hashers and gear remain account-bound. Eligible fusion consumes input assets; account-bound outputs stay bound.

Issuance still needs controls. Fusion can concentrate power, and bound rewards may substitute for marketplace purchases.

Spending recycles straight back into circulation.

A permanent-lock component.

Applicable TRDR spend: 40% permanent lock, 50% working treasury, 10% Mining Claims. Claim tax is separate: 100% treasury.

A verifiable, irreversible lock. Treasury holdings are discretionary; claim distributions can be sold. Net liquid supply can still increase.

Competition is funded by fresh emissions.

Entry-funded prize pools.

Standard tournaments: 92% prize pool, 3% Mining Claims, 5% treasury, in the entry token. Claim holders pay only the 92% prize contribution.

A redistribution model, not a source of universal profit. Fees, competition quality and repeat participation must justify the cost. Any subsidised prizes need a separate budget.

RAG

The wider frontier.

Major unlocks, discounted Hasher purchases, limited editions and special events. It has its own distribution and unlock schedule; TRDR’s emissions rules do not protect RAG’s price.

TRDR

The game’s reward economy.

Planned rewards and recurring game spending. Its supply budget is separate from RAG. Token roles only matter if players actually use the games.

Planned RAG supply and unlocks: a 50M planned cap released over 48 months. Source: RAG IDO token.xlsx, “token schedule” tab (selected 26 October 2026; private workbook, not published). This is the plan: no live mint, circulating supply or launch date is confirmed. Mechanisms are planned or under development and need implementation verification. Inspect the model ↑

Can the game hold up
without the next gold rush?

The strongest version of “this time is different” is evidence that players stay and spend when rewards and growth slow down.

01

Retention

Do players return after rewards halve, and when token prices fall?

02

Voluntary demand

Are people buying play, progression and competition—not just the expectation of selling later?

03

Net supply

Publish emissions, locks, distributions, treasury movements and asset issuance together.

04

Liquidity stress

Test withdrawals and sell pressure against real pool depth. FDV is not cash available to sellers.

We can design against the old failure modes.
We still have to build a game worth staying for.
Explore Red & Green ↗Follow the build on Discord ↗

Sources, not slogans.

This is a comparison of economic failure modes, not an allegation of fraud or a legal finding that these projects were Ponzi schemes. STEPN is included for its historical contraction, not as a claim that it has shut down. Historical figures are dated snapshots, not live prices. Average sale prices and floor prices are different metrics and are not directly comparable. The causal explanation is editorial analysis, not a controlled attribution study. Sources reviewed 4 November 2026.

  1. Axie Infinity · Dev Journal: Economic Balancing ↗4 Jan 2022 · Primary source. SLP issuance, breeding demand and proposed balancing options.
  2. Axie Infinity · Season 20 economic changes ↗3 Feb 2022 · Primary source. Approximately 4× issuance versus breeding burn; reward reductions.
  3. The Block · The decline of Axie Infinity ↗16 May 2022 · Reported average Axie sale prices for July 2021 and April 2022.
  4. Axie Infinity · Updates to SLP’s monetary policy ↗11 Jan 2024 · Primary source. Later policy cap and stability-fund design.
  5. Fortune · Pegaxy and play-to-earn ↗16 Apr 2022 · Historical Pega floor-price snapshots.
  6. Naavik / Deconstructor of Fun · Redemption or Ruin? ↗June 2022 · Research on asset supply, player growth, token prices and additional shocks.
  7. PlayToEarn · Pegaxy economy updates ↗29 Sep 2022 · Reporting on the move to entry-funded Pledge Racing.
  8. Pegaxy · VIS migration complete ↗Primary source · Later migration, token burns and revised claim funding.
  9. CoinGecko · Pegaxy token and gameplay guide ↗Historical mechanics · PGX, VIS, racing, breeding and fusion; not a claim about current rules.
  10. Pegaxy Official · Version 2.0 update ↗1 Dec 2021 · Primary source. Early reported Pega population and racing rewards.
  11. CoinGecko · The state of Crabada in 2022 ↗Historical study, updated Apr 2024 · NFT population, TUS supply and the asset-demand cycle.
  12. PlayToEarn · Crabada closure and transition ↗15 May 2023 · Battle Game closure and marketplace transition.
  13. STEPN · Tokenomic ↗Primary source · GMT / GST roles and GST’s infinite supply design.
  14. CryptoSlate · STEPN’s 2022 contraction ↗24 Jun 2022 · Historical token drawdown and Solana sneaker prices.
  15. STEPN · Activation Code System ↗Primary source · Access controls existed here too; gating alone is not sufficient.
  16. STEPN · Frequently Asked Questions ↗Primary source · Independent realms, GST tokens and prices.

Editorial research and a proposed game design. No token-price targets, guaranteed yields or guaranteed asset values. This report is not affiliated with Axie Infinity or Pegaxy.